St. John's Law Review
Volume 40
Number 1 Volume 40, December 1965, Number
1

Article 19

General Municipal Law Section 50-e: Statutory or Judicial Stay of
an Action as Extending the Statute of Limitations and Its
Applicability to the Public Authorities Law
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1965]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

insured may recover from MVAIC for injuries caused by an
uninsured or unidentified motorist.' 7 Such a provision is known
as the uninsured motorist endorsement. In MVAIC v. McDonnell,'
the plaintiff's insurance policy contained such a clause and, is
required by the Insurance Law, the deceased's executor demanded
arbitration on the wrongful death claim.' 9 MVAIC contended
that the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death 20
barred plaintiff's demand for arbitration. The court, however,
concluded that the claim was based on the uninsured motorist
endorsement as provided in the insurance contract rather than
on the unidentified motorist's negligence which caused the automobile accident, and therefore, the six-year statute of limitations
for contract actions was applicable. 2 1 It is important to note
that a "qualified person," i.e., one who does not have automobile
liability insurance, would not have the benefit of the breach of
contract statute of limitations since the claim will not have arisen
out of an insurance contract. Therefore, the two-year statute
of limitations for a wrongful death action or the three-year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions would be applicable.
General Municipal Law Section 50-e: Statutory or judicial stay
of an action as extending the statute of limitations and its
applicability to the Public Authorities Law.
CPLR 204(a) provides that where commencement of an action
is stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of
that stay is not included in computing the time within which the
action 22must be commenced. In Barchet v. New York City Trans.
Auth., the defense of the statute of limitations was raised since
the action had not been commenced within one year and thirty
days after the accrual of the claim.2 3 The plaintiff, pointing out
that the court had taken fifty-three days to adjudicate the request
to file a late notice of claim, contended that such time should
not be computed in the running of the statute. 24 Furthermore,
17

N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2-a).

1823 App. Div. 2d 773, 258 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1965).
' 0 Note, MVAIC Six Years Later-A Practical Appraisal, 39 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 321, 335-37 (1965).
20 N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 130.

CPLR 213.
Misc. 2d 414, 259 N.Y.S2d 470 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
23 N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 1212(2) ; Forastad v. New York City Trans.
Auth., 13 App. Div. 2d 836, 216 N.Y.S2d 116 (2d Dep't 1961) ; Hernandez
v. New York City Trans. Auth., 41 Misc. 2d 123, 245 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup.
Ct. 1963), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 968, 251 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Ist Dep't 1964).
This section demands compliance
AUTH. LAW § 1212(2).
24 N.Y. Pu.
with § 50-e of the General Municipal Law which requires a notice of claim
to be filed within ninety days after the accrual of the claim.
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since a summons and complaint may not be served until thirty
days after the filing of a notice of claim,2

5

the plaintiff urged

that such statutory stay should not be included within the running
of the statute of limitations. The court ruled for plaintiff on both
points and, pursuant to CPLR 204(a), extended the statute of
limitations for a period equal to the time lost through the stay
of the proceedings by the court and the statutory prohibition.
It is also interesting to note that many authorities, such as
the Transit Authority, have separate statutes of limitations rather
than a standard limitation as provided in Section 50-i of the
General Municipal Law. In the instant case, the statute of limitations for the Transit Authority is one year and thirty days as
opposed to one year and ninety days for city or municipal governments.2 6 A statute of limitations applicable to all municipalities
and public authorities would be more expedient and reasonable.
General Municipal Law Section 50-e: Amending notice of claim
subsequent to expiration of filing period.
As a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action
against a public corporation, e.g., city, town or municipality, a
notice of claim must be filed within ninety days after the claim
accrues.2 7 The notice of claim filed in Montana v. Incorporated
Village of Lynbrook 28 was defective because it failed to specify
the damage and the manner in which the claim arose. The court,
in accordance with the discretion established by Section 50-e of
the General Municipal Law, allowed a subsequent amendment to
the notice of claim. 29 A construction of the provisions permitting
amendment of most faulty filings unless prejudice is shown against
the public corporation, will, in many cases, prevent hardship to a
claimant. The rule of thumb is to file a notice of claim in accordance with whatever facts are available, concentrating on filing
within the ninety-day period rather than strict compliance with
the required contents.
General Municipal Law Section 50-e: New period for filing notice
of claim allowed in fraud action extraneous to the original tort.
In Orsell v. Board of Educ.,30 the infant plaintiff, upon requesting information from defendant's representative regarding a
2
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AUTH. LAW § 1212(1).
PuB. AUTH. LAW

Compare N.Y.

§ 50-i.

§ 1212, with N.Y.

MUNIc.

§ 50-e.
23 App. Div. 2d 585, 256 N.Y.S2d 651 (2d Dep't 1965).
29 N.Y. MuNic. LAW § 50-e(6).
3023 App. Div. 2d 703, 256 N.Y.S.2d 970 (3d Dep't 1965).
27 N.Y. MuNIc. LAW
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